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Abstract 
This research uncovers a well-defined monetary policy regime starting in 1986 in the 
aggregate Euro Area. Both alternative solution-estimation methods employed - optimal 
control  cum GMM, and dynamic programming cum FIML - identify a regime of strict 
inflation targeting with interest rate smoothing. The unemployment gap, properly estimated as 
quasi real-time information, is a relevant element in the information set of the monetary 
authority, despite not being included in its preferences. 
The emergence of the regime relates to the improvement of the volatility trade-off between 
inflation and unemployment gap since the mid-80s. Additional improving factors have been 
milder supply shocks and better ability of policymakers to set the interest rate closer to 
optimum. 
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Macroeconomic Volatility Trade-off and Monetary Policy Regime in 
the Euro Area 
 
1. Introduction* 
Along the last thirty years, the macroeconomic performance of the current Euro 
Area, in terms of the main stabilisation policy objectives, has changed markedly. Figure 
1 illustrates this change, showing five years averages of the variability of quarterly 
inflation and unemployment gap (u-gap), of the aggregate Euro Area between 1972:I 
and 2001:II. The macroeconomic volatility performance of the Euro Area has clearly 
improved since 1986, with low and systematically decreasing variability of both 
inflation and u-gap. 
We interpret this picture within Taylor's (1979) framework. The transitory Phillips 
trade-off between the levels of inflation and unemployment gap implies a permanent 
trade-off between their variability around desired levels. As further developed by Taylor 
(1994) and Fuhrer (1997), the permanent variability trade-off is interpretable as an 
efficiency policy frontier for the monetary policy regime. This policy frontier - often 
called Taylor curve - is negatively sloped and convex to the origin. Its locus depends on 
the policy regime and on the variability of the shocks hitting the economy, and its slope 
is a function of the structure of the economy, including the elasticity of the transitory 
Phillips curve. The optimal policy choice yields a specific combination in the efficiency 
frontier, which is a function of the relative weight attached to inflation and activity gap 
volatility in the policymaker's loss function. In this context, the distance between actual 
macro performance and the frontier may be interpreted as a measure of the policy 
inefficiency. FEP Working Paper no. 123, March 2003 
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This paper investigates the contribution of a new monetary policy regime to the 
favourable shift in the volatility trade-off of the Euro Area, observed since 1986 and 
reinforced thereafter. In the process, we must isolate this factor from the other three 
possibly driving the implied shift of the Taylor curve and/or the position of the 
economy relative to that efficiency frontier, namely: (i) changes in the structure of the 
economy; (ii) shifts in the degree of smoothness of shocks buffeting the Area; and (iii) 
improvement in the efficiency of monetary policy.  
In order to pursue this approach, we need to estimate the Euro Area policymaker's 
preferences in a framework that allows for simultaneous identification of the Area 
macroeconomic structure, the supply shocks, and policy efficiency.
1 Two recent studies 
for the US case, Favero and Rovelli (2001) and Dennis (2001), seem to fit these 
requirements. They both use a small macroeconomic model suggested by Rudebusch 
and Svensson (1999) to represent aggregate supply and aggregate demand, together 
with an interest rate equation describing conditions for optimality of the policymaker's 
actions. Such optimality conditions are derived by Favero and Rovelli using optimal 
control, while Dennis uses dynamic programming, building on the use of inverse-
control theory by Salemi (1995). In terms of econometric estimation of the system, the 
two approaches - optimal control and dynamic programming - lead to two different 
estimators, GMM and FIML, respectively. 
Given the balanced assessment of strengths and weaknesses of these two methods, 
we refine and adapt both the Favero and Rovelli (2001) and Dennis (2001) frameworks 
to the Euro Area, and compare the results. An important refinement refers to the u-gap 
series used in the estimation. Instead of using measures available from official sources 
at the time of the research, we build a quasi real-time estimate of the u-gap, which is FEP Working Paper no. 123, March 2003 
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closer to the information available to policymakers in real-time, i.e. at the time of actual 
decisions. 
Even though its observed shift in volatility parallels that of the US, the Euro Area 
case has two important particularities that render our goal potentially more complex. 
First, there was no formal unique European monetary policy regime until the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999, and, until then, the national monetary authorities 
operated within heterogeneous monetary policy institutional frameworks – Cukierman 
(1992, chapter 19). Second, the Euro Area time series are weighted averages of the 11 
member-states forming the EMU, as published in the Area Wide Model Database 
(AWMD) by the European Central Bank (ECB), possibly masking structural 
heterogeneity. 
In spite of these difficulties, the data and the events in the European monetary 
integration throughout 1979-1999 motivate our hypothesis that the variability trade-off 
improvement is concurrent with the de facto emergence of a well-defined monetary 
policy regime in the aggregate Euro Area in the mid-80s. Such regime would be 
associated to the leadership of the exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary 
System by German monetary policy. The Bundesbank initiated a new regime in 1986, 
stabilising the inflation target at 2 percent per year, after having gradually decreased it 
since the beginning of the 80s. 
The exchange rate events and the nominal convergence record in the Euro Area 
motivate our claim concerning the monetary policy regime emergence in 1986. In fact, 
after April 1986 there were almost no realignments of exchange-rate parities within the 
exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary System. Even the 1992-93 
exchange rate crisis turned out to have no significant structural consequences. Exchange FEP Working Paper no. 123, March 2003 
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rate stability, together with the liberalisation of capital movements – capital controls 
were practically ineffective after 1986
2 -, explains why monetary policy of individual 
countries has significantly lost autonomy after 1986-87. Furthermore, nominal 
convergence towards Germany – especially in terms of inflation rates – had already 
been achieved, in large part, by the second half of the 80s. 
In addition to the recent historical record, the hypothesis of a new informal monetary 
regime since 1986 - anticipating the formal 1999's EMU - is also compatible with 
arguments put forth previously in different contexts. McCallum (1997) noted that in 
many episodes of monetary history institutional changes lag behind actual policy 
changes. Muscatelli and Trecroci (2000) surveyed evidence of this hypothesis, to which 
Muscatelli et al. (2000) added new results. Doménech et al. (2002) present evidence 
that led them, in Doménech et al. (2001), to study a model of the EMU Area with data 
beginning in 1986:I. 
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 discusses an appropriate 
optimising model for monetary policy analysis in the Euro Area, describes the data and 
presents structural stability tests. Section 3 briefly explains two alternative solution-
estimation procedures and comparatively discusses their results. Finally, Section 4 
offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. A Model for Monetary Policy Analysis in the Euro Area 
Our structural model derives from a simple optimising framework for monetary 
policy analysis, in which the loss functional of the central bank describing its 
intertemporal preferences is minimised subject to the dynamic structure of the aggregate 
economy. This section sets up the model for optimisation, which, in turn, is solved in FEP Working Paper no. 123, March 2003 
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section 3. Thus it presents and identifies the dynamic economic structure - an AD-AS 
system - and the loss functional - an intertemporal aggregation of quadratic loss 
functions. 
Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply 
The structure of the Euro Area aggregate economy is modelled as a simple 
backward-looking aggregate demand - aggregate supply system similar to the one 
applied by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) to US data. Aggregate demand is basically 
an IS equation expressed in terms of u-gap, and aggregate supply an expectations 
augmented Phillips equation with the short-term trade-off between u-gap and inflation. 
Rudebusch and Svensson's motivation for using this model was threefold: tractability 
and transparency of results; good fit to recent US data; and proximity to many 
policymakers' views about the dynamics of the economy, and to the spirit of many 
policy-oriented macro-econometric models, including some used by central banks. In 
addition, we have three reasons of our own. 
First, it has been widely used in recent empirical studies of monetary policy rules or 
regimes. That is the case, among many others, of Favero and Rovelli (2001), Dennis 
(2001), and, for European countries, Peersman and Smets (1999), Taylor (1999), and 
Aksoy et al. (2002). To be sure, the intensive use does not necessarily mean that this 
model effectively represents the structure of actual developed economies - see 
Cukierman (2001). It reflects, though, its sensible theoretical and empirical properties, 
from which Goodhart (2000) stresses the realistic inclusion of monetary transmission 
lags. 
Second, even though most of the uses of the model relate to the US, it is reasonable 
to expect the structure of the Euro Area to be broadly similar, as both are large and FEP Working Paper no. 123, March 2003 
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relatively closed economies - see Rudebusch and Svensson (2002). In support of this 
belief, Agresti and Mojon (2001) found that the business cycle of the aggregate Euro 
Area is similar to the US in several respects, and Angeloni et al. (2002) show how the 
responses of the Area's output and inflation to monetary actions are quite close to those 
typically reported for the US. In fact, both Peersman and Smets (1999) and Taylor 
(1999) have successfully estimated this model with aggregate data of a core of EMU 
countries. 
Third, the unemployment gap series that we use has been computed within a system 
that features a similar Phillips equation - specifically, a backward-looking version of the 
one in Aguiar and Martins (2002). 
We proceed now with the identification of the specific formulation of the Rudebusch 
and Svensson's AD-AS system that best fits the Euro Area aggregate data - quarterly 
time-series 1972:I-2001:II. For the period 1970-1998, the data source is the Area Wide 
Model Database (AWMD) published in Fagan et al (2001), whilst for subsequent 
periods compatible updates are taken from several issues of the ECB Monthly Bulletin. 
The inflation rate - π - is measured through the GDP deflator, and the nominal short-
term interest rate - i - is the quarterly average of the 3-month interest rate EURIBOR. 
Our proxy for exogenous supply shocks is the deviation of imported from domestic 
inflation - Imπ, in percentage points. The unemployment gap - x, in percentage points - 
is computed as a time-varying NAIRU minus the actual unemployment rate. 
The unobservable NAIRU is computed from a backward-looking version of the 
unobserved components model estimated by maximum likelihood with the Kalman 
filter in Aguiar and Martins (2002). By using the filter updating equations from each 
period, instead of the end of sample smoother, we are able to suitably interpret our u-FEP Working Paper no. 123, March 2003 
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gap series as quasi real-time estimates. In fact, each u-gap is an optimal estimate in each 
time period, given the identified model and the information available at that period.
3 
Here, we clearly differ from Favero and Rovelli (2001) and Dennis (2001), which use 
estimates of the gap obtained at the time of their research. Our quasi real-time estimates 
of the gap are conceptually closer to the policymakers' real-time perceptions about the 
state of the economy. 
The assumptions about the timing of information gathering can be quite relevant for 
policy analysis, as has been argued in the literature, and as can be illustrated in our case. 
In the literature, the importance of using data available to policymakers in real-time in 
ex-post evaluations of monetary policy has been profusely shown, for the US case, by 
Orphanides (2001a and 2002). Nelson and Nikolov (2001) also report a pattern of 
official real-time output gap misperceptions in the UK during the 70s similar to the one 
identified by Orphanides for the US. In both cases, the authors inspected the 
information actually used at the meetings of monetary policy committees.
4 
Here, however, we cannot use proper real-time information, not only because there is 
no Euro Area aggregate real-time statistical data for almost the whole sample period, 
but also because we evaluate the policy of a notional central bank. Instead, we adopt a 
quasi real-time approach, as explained above.
5 Figure 2 illustrates, for our case, the 
discrepancies between ex-post and quasi real-time estimates. It shows the u-gap series 
given by the Kalman smoother (i.e. using for each period the entire sample information) 
and the unsmoothed series given by the Kalman filter (i.e. using for each period the 
information available up to then). The difference is interpretable as the quasi real-time 
gap measurement error faced by policymakers. FEP Working Paper no. 123, March 2003 
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With this Euro Area data set (quasi real-time u-gaps and aggregate macro data from 
AWMD) we first identify the AD-AS system, combining information from both OLS 
and FIML estimations, and then submit it to structural stability tests. The best 
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where the equations are, respectively, the IS function - representing aggregate demand - 
and the Phillips function - representing aggregate supply.
6 
This specification implies a transmission of monetary actions to the u-gap similar to 
Peersman and Smets' (2001), in spite of the differences in empirical methods and data, 
and is compatible with Angeloni et al.'s (2002) extensive reading of the evidence on the 
Euro Area transmission of policy. In short, interest rate changes affect output 
temporarily, with effects peaking at more or less one year, while inflation hardly moves 
during the first year, and gradually changes over the subsequent few years. 
The need for structural stability tests arises from the Lucas critique, to which this 
AD-AS system is, in theory, subject. In fact, if the true dynamic behaviour of inflation 
and u-gap includes forward-looking elements - as dynamic general equilibrium analysis 
and the new Keynesian theory prescribe -, the reduced form coefficients of this 
backward-looking model are not stable when the monetary policy regime changes. 
Simulations in Lindé (2000) suggest that the Lucas critique may be quantitatively 
important for the Rudebusch-Svensson model. In complete contrast, Rudebusch's 
(2002a) simulations suggest the empirical irrelevance of the Lucas critique, 
corroborating estimation results in Estrella and Fuhrer (1999). Thus, as usual, the actual FEP Working Paper no. 123, March 2003 
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importance of the Lucas critique is an empirical matter of structural stability, which 
should be addressed prior to the use of the model for policy analysis. 
We put our AD-AS system to test for structural stability over the entire sample. As 
there is no clear a priori about the timing of possible structural breaks, the appropriate 
test is based on the Andrews (1993, equations 4.1 and 4.2, page 835) sup-Wald statistic. 
It turns out that the null hypothesis of no structural change is rejected.
7 
The dates of the structural breaks, estimated with Hansen's (2001) procedure, are 
1995:II for the Phillips equation and 1996:II for the IS, when jointly estimated by 
FIML. As there is no evidence of other breaks, the hypothesised 1986 change in policy 
regime has no Lucas critique effect on our AD-AS structure of the Euro Area. In what 
follows, in spite of the instability of the system in the mid-90s, we use the data up to 
2001:II, since we need the degrees of freedom for the proper estimation during the new 
monetary regime period beginning in 1986. As summed up below in the concluding 
remarks section, we try to infer the relevance of ignoring the mid-90s structural break as 
we go along, by comparing the results with data truncated at 1995:II. 
Central Bank's Preferences 
Following fairly standard assumptions in the literature, we model central bank's 
preferences as an intertemporal loss functional. In each period the loss function is 
quadratic in the deviations of inflation and u-gap from their desired levels (π* and zero, 
respectively), as well as in the change in the interest rate, which is the policy 
instrument.
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The inclusion of u-gap variability in L is generally considered compatible with the 
statutes of modern central banks, such as the US Fed. Even inflation targeting regimes, 
which have a formally quantified commitment to price stability, also have a second 
order objective concerning growth and employment - see Svensson (2001). However, 
the ECB statutes, similarly to the Bundesbank's, are not entirely clear on the 
significance that real activity stabilisation has in its legal mandate, as they merely state 
in the 2
nd article of its Chapter II, that (ECB, 2002, page 2) 
“[…] the primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability. 
Without prejudice to the objective of price stability it shall support the 
general economic policies in the Community […]” 
 
The ECB Governing Council, when announcing its stability-oriented monetary 
policy strategy, established that (ECB, 1998, article 2º) 
"As mandated by the Treaty establishing the European Community, the 
maintenance of price stability will be the primary objective of the ESCB. 
Therefore, the ESCB's monetary policy strategy will focus strictly on this 
objective." 
 
This led some authors - for instance, Goodhart (1998) - to argue that output is not 
supposed to enter the true ECB objective function. In general, McCallum (2001a) also 
argues that, for uncertainty reasons, monetary policy should not respond strongly to 
output gaps. All summed-up, we specify our baseline loss, L, as a flexible inflation 
targeting regime, which nests the strict inflation targeting case - no concern with the 
variance of the gap. We let the evidence discriminate which of these systems better fits 
the revealed preferences of the Euro Area notional policymaker. 
In what concerns the inclusion of the changes in the interest rate, we follow a 
relatively standard practice in the empirically oriented literature, which is to consider 
that the policymaker also dislikes variations in the policy instrument - the so-called 
interest rate smoothing. Even though theoretical central bank loss functions do not FEP Working Paper no. 123, March 2003 
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include the instrument as part of the final goals of policy - see Walsh (1998) -, the fact 
is that optimal interest rates simulated from models with such loss functions are 
substantially more volatile than actual short-term interest rates - Sack (2000). Central 
banks seem to prefer to change interest rates in small discrete steps in the same direction 
over extensive periods, and reverse the path of rates only infrequently - for a review, 
see, for example, Sack and Wieland (2000).
9 Although several authors have argued that 
the evidence of policy inertia has little structural content, mostly reflecting econometric 
problems - see Rudebusch (2001), for instance -, recent simulations and estimations in 
Favero (2001) and English et al. (2002) reiterate the evidence in favour of intentional 
smoothing. 
Before we proceed to the optimisation exercises, a brief reference to the exclusion of 
money and exchange rates is in order. Following the currently consensual monetary 
policy analysis framework - see McCallum (2001b) -, no monetary aggregate is 
included in our model, implying that money is not considered relevant for policy, 
neither as an instrument nor as an intermediate target.
10 As a result, though, the 
estimates should be interpreted with some caution, since no distinction between money 
supply and money demand surfaces in the model and, thus, some coefficients may be 
reflecting mixed effects from demand and policy changes.  
As for the absence of an exchange-rate variable as an intermediate or final target, it is 
grounded in two arguments. On one hand, exchange rates are likely to matter less in a 
policy rule of a large and relatively closed economy like the Euro Area than in a small 
open economy - see Peersman and Smets (1999). On the other hand, the evidence in 
Clarida and Gertler (1997) indicates that the Bundesbank's concerns with the DMark 
exchange-rate when conducting monetary policy were essentially related to its FEP Working Paper no. 123, March 2003 
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importance as a determinant of domestic inflationary pressures rather than as a final 
target per se. This seems to be the case for the ECB as well, as recently put forward by 
Gaspar and Issing (2002). And this role of the exchange-rate as determinant of 
inflationary pressures is already implicitly considered in our model, through the 
exogenous shock variable in the Phillips curve, which is the lagged deviation of 
imported from domestic inflation. 
 
3. Monetary Policy Regime in the Euro Area 
This section begins with the description of two alternative ways of solving and 
linking the optimisation problem to the estimation of policymakers' structural 
preference parameters jointly with the aggregate economic structure and shocks. Such 
alternatives yield different estimation methods and, thus, different estimates, which we 
compare and use in testing the hypothesis of emergence of a new monetary policy 
regime around 1986, concurrent with the improvement in the volatility performance of 
the aggregate Euro Area. 
Frameworks for Estimating Policymakers' Preferences 
For the sake of realism and estimation feasibility, we circumscribe the optimisation 
problem to a discretionary policy regime, in which the policymaker solves for the 
optimal closed-loop system, i.e. sets its policy sequentially, in each period, given the 
then observed state of the economy. In this case, the monetary authority chooses in each 
period the interest rate that minimises the loss functional subject to the dynamic 
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subject to system (1). 
As the policy control variable is the short-term interest rate, the solution is, 
irrespectively of the adopted method, an expression describing the optimal interest rate 
as function of the state variables of the system. Once supplemented by an innovation, 
that expression joins the system describing the dynamics of the economy, and 
estimation of the structural parameters of the model may proceed. 
The approach devised by Favero and Rovelli (2001) - henceforth equivalently 
referred to as "optimal control cum GMM" and "Euler-GMM" - is based on the Euler 
equation of the system - first order condition -, which in our case takes the form 
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This equation is then truncated at four quarters ahead, and the partial derivatives in it 
are expanded and written as function of the relevant aggregate-supply and aggregate-
demand coefficients in (1). At this stage, the expression of the first-order condition 
conveniently includes the cross-equation restrictions of the system, ensuring that the 
loss function is properly minimised subject to the constraints given by the economy 
structure. Further supplemented with an innovation - to allow for estimation - the Euler 
equation becomes 
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Favero and Rovelli justify truncation at four quarters with two arguments. First, 
discounting in the infinite-horizon loss function means that expectations about the state 
of the economy carry less relevant information for the present conduct of policy, as they FEP Working Paper no. 123, March 2003 
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relate to periods further ahead. Second, expanding the horizon would complicate the 
equation and bring collinearities to the system, causing great difficulties to estimation. 
We argue, in addition, that the four-quarter forecast horizon seems to be in line with the 
forecasting needs and abilities of real world policymakers - see, for instance, the 
macroeconomic projections in IMF (2001), and in the Greenbook available at each FED 
open market committee meeting as discussed in Perez (2001). Moreover, evidence from 
estimated policy rules suggests that actual policy involves forecast horizons of inflation 
not beyond four quarters – see, for example, Orphanides (2001b), and Boivin and 
Giannoni (2002). 
Equation (5) is jointly estimated with the system (1), generating estimates of the 
coefficients describing the monetary policy regime - µ, λ, and π* - as well as of the 
aggregate-demand and aggregate-supply coefficients, and the system's innovations. 
Because expectations are replaced by actual observations, estimation uses GMM, as it 
seems reasonable to assume that policymakers use efficiently the information available 
when forming expectations. Following Favero and Rovelli's procedures, we use four 
lags of all the system's variables as instruments, and base inference in a 
heteroescedasticity and auto-correlation-consistent variance-covariance matrix.
11 
Employing this method in the more restricted loss function of strict inflation targeting 
with interest rate smoothing is straightforward, setting λ to zero in equation (5). 
An alternative to Favero and Rovelli's is the method recently designed by Dennis 
(2001) - hereafter equivalently designated "dynamic programming cum FIML" and 
"Lagrangean-FIML" - after the inverse control strategy used by Salemi (1995). This 
method uses the result that with a quadratic objective function and linear stochastic 
constraints the postulated policymaker optimisation problem fits into the stochastic FEP Working Paper no. 123, March 2003 
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linear regulator problem - see Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000) -, and, as such, Chow's 
(1997) Lagrangean solution can be employed. 
The approach begins by writing the dynamic constraints in state-space form: 
1 1 0 + + + + + = t t t t Ε C Bu AX X A  (6) 
where u stands for the control variable - the interest rate, i - and X is the vector of state 
variables. In our case (see the Appendix for details) 
[] '
1 2 1 2 1 3 2 1 t t t t t t t t t t t t Imπ i i i x x x X − − − − − − − − ∆ = π π π π  (7) 
The Lagrangean solution consists of introducing a vector of Lagrange multipliers, 
and setting to zero its derivatives in order to the control and state variables, thus 
obtaining a set of first-order conditions. The multipliers and the derivatives of the 
policymaker objective function with respect to the control and state variables are written 
as linear functions and, together with (6) and the first order conditions, yield a solution 
to the policymaker problem that is an optimal state-contingent linear policy rule 
g GX u t t + =  (8) 
This rule is computable, for a specific set of values of the model structural 
parameters, with simple calculus and algebra - see the Appendix and Chow (1997, 
sections 2.3-2.4, pages 22-25). In our specific case, G is a (1×11) vector, and the 
optimal linear policy rule takes the form 
t t t t t t
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 (9) 
Once supplemented with an innovation, (9) joins the equations in (1) in a three 
equations system. Under the assumption of normality, the residuals of this system are 
used to compute the data log-likelihood function, conditional on the first 4 observations, 
which is then maximised by numerical methods with respect to the model structural FEP Working Paper no. 123, March 2003 
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parameters - the aggregate-supply and demand coefficients, c1 through c10, and the 
policymaker's preference parameters, λ, and µ. The procedure can be similarly 
employed in cases of more restricted loss functions, such as one of strict inflation 
targeting with interest rate smoothing - in which case λ is set to zero in the solution 
equations leading to the optimal linear policy rule, without, however, changing its form. 
Dennis' approach consists of a sequence of steps involving a component of dynamic 
solution and another of estimation. At each step, the solution component consists in 
using the Lagrangean method to solve for the optimal linear policy rule, given certain 
values of the model coefficients - c1 through c10, λ and µ. Then, in the estimation 
component, this optimal feed-back rule joins the aggregate-demand and aggregate-
supply equations, in a three equations system, from which the model structural 
coefficients are re-estimated, by maximum likelihood. Solution and estimation are 
sequentially repeated until both converge into a set of estimates of the structural 
parameters of the model.
12 
Since this approach does not generate a direct estimate of π*, we compute it as the 
sample average of the nominal interest rate minus the estimate of the real equilibrium 
interest rate - which is given by c1/(- c5) in system (1). 
In addition to estimating the monetary policy regime, and the Phillips coefficient, 
measuring the trade-off between the levels of u-gap and inflation, both frameworks 
offer some information concerning the volatility of the supply shocks, given by the 
standard deviation of the aggregate-supply equation. Moreover, the standard error of the 
optimising interest rate equation can be seen as an indication of the ability of 
policymakers to maintain interest rates close to optimum, and, thus, to maintain the FEP Working Paper no. 123, March 2003 
 
  18
economy close to the Taylor curve. This interpretation is, however, subject to caution, 
as inverse control theory attributes this error to specification imperfections. 
Euro Area 1972-1985 versus 1986-2001 
We now apply comparatively the estimation procedures just described to the case of 
the aggregate Euro Area. Motivated by the macroeconomic record of the Area, briefly 
reviewed in section 1, we compare the results before and after 1986. 
Table 1 summarises the results for our baseline loss function - flexible inflation 
targeting with interest rate smoothing. The left-hand side shows that, for 1972:I-
1985:IV, both procedures estimate an inflation target somewhat above 9 percentage 
points and a real equilibrium interest rate a bit below 1 percentage point, but fail to 
estimate reasonable and precise coefficients associated to the deviations of the gap and 
inflation from their targets. The right-hand side highlights the change in monetary 
policy and macroeconomic conditions after 1986, revealing that the inflation target 
seems to have fallen below 3 percentage points, while the real interest rate of 
equilibrium has risen substantially to around 4.5 percentage points. However, as in the 
first sub-sample, both procedures fail to generate sensible and precise estimates of λ and 
µ. Hence, we conclude that a regime of flexible inflation targeting with interest rate 
smoothing is not compatible with the aggregate Euro Area data, neither before nor after 
1986. 
In table 2 we inspect whether a loss function with strict inflation targeting and 
interest rate smoothing is more appropriate to describe the Euro Area case - a hypothesis 
that seems compatible with the statutes of the ECB, as mentioned in section 2. Before 
1986 the weight of interest rate smoothing is not precisely estimated, at standard 
confidence levels, and the previous results in terms of inflation target and equilibrium FEP Working Paper no. 123, March 2003 
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real interest rate are broadly confirmed. There is some evidence against the regime of 
strict inflation targeting during the 1972-1985 period. In fact, the standard error of the 
residuals of the optimising interest rate equations is, in both procedures, larger than in 
table 1 and, furthermore, the J-test reveals that the moments orthogonality conditions 
for GMM estimation are now rejected at one percent significance. 
In contrast to the previous results, the right-hand side of table 2 shows that a 
monetary policy regime of strict inflation targeting with interest rate smoothing can be 
well identified and estimated for the sample period beginning in 1986. The Euro Area 
inflation target is estimated quite precisely at 2.7 percentage points by both procedures, 
and the equilibrium real interest rate is estimated - also with accordance between 
procedures - at 4.5 percentage points. The weight of interest rate smoothing in the 
policymaker's loss function is statistically significant at less than 5 percent in both 
procedures - even though with a large discrepancy in the estimates, which is further 
discussed below. 
The results are thus compatible with the hypothesis formulated in section 1 - that the 
emergence of a well-defined monetary policy regime targeting a low inflation rate is 
part of the explanation for the improvement in the Taylor trade-off observed in the 
aggregate Euro Area since 1986. Using the sub-sample 1986:I-2001:II, we identify the 
aggregate regime as one strictly targeting the inflation rate at 2.7 percentage points, with 
a significant element of policy instrument smoothing. Notably, this regime 
identification seems to be quite robust, as it is confirmed by the two alternative 
procedures employed.
13 The accordance between our results from the two methods may 
shed some light on the discrepancies found in the original applications to the US by 
Favero and Rovelli (2001) and Dennis (2001). The discrepancies between their results FEP Working Paper no. 123, March 2003 
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include different inference regarding the weight of the output gap in the policymaker's 
objective function, and different inflation targets and equilibrium real interest rates. In 
view of our research, maybe such disagreements have arisen not from the different 
procedures, bur rather from differences in sample periods, discount factors, and output 
gap series.  
As for the other three factors of volatility improvement in the Euro Area, we have 
already checked in section 2 that there has been no significant change in the aggregate 
economic structure in the 80s. In turn, the supply shocks seem to have been milder in 
the second sample period, as the standard deviation of the Phillips equation residual 
decreased by around 40 percent. Also, there is some evidence that the ability of the 
notional policymaker to run interest rates closer to their optimal path has improved after 
1986. In fact, with a remarkable consistency, the standard deviation of the Euler 
equation residual fell by 42 percent, and that of the optimal linear policy rule fell by 
43.5 percent. This interpretation, however, should be considered tentative, not only 
because control theory ascribes a model specification meaning to the deviation of the 
control variable from its optimal path, but also because the residuals have different 
meanings across the sub-samples, as there is no clear policy regime before 1986. 
Taking now a closer look at the identified regime of strict inflation targeting after 
1986, we find two strong indications that the u-gap, in spite of not being a final 
objective, has been considered valuable information for monetary policy in the 
aggregate Euro Area. First, if the lagged u-gaps are excluded from the instrument set in 
the GMM estimation, results are quite different. Notably, the interest rate smoothing 
weight is not precisely estimated, the Phillips elasticity looses its significance, several 
estimates change substantially, and the standard error of the residual of the Euler FEP Working Paper no. 123, March 2003 
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equation doubles its value. Second, as table 3 shows, the optimal linear policy rule 
obtained through the dynamic programming cum FIML approach indicates that the 
policy instrument reacts substantially to the u-gaps. In fact, optimal interest rates react 
slightly more to each additional percentage point of u-gap than to an additional point of 
the inflation rate, both in the cumulated short-run - 0.215 versus 0.203 - and in the long-
run - 2.323 versus 2.190. 
Table 3 also shows a clear change in the optimal linear policy rule from the first to 
the second sub-sample period - a decrease in the explanation of the interest rate by its 
past and an increase in its reaction to both inflation and the u-gap. The better ability of 
the optimal linear policy rule to replicate the second moments of actual interest rates in 
the second sample period also indicates the profound difference between the two eras, 
as regards the existence of a detectable policy regime. However, the optimal linear feed-
back rule for 1986:I-2001:II still exhibits a quite large sensitivity of the policy 
instrument to its past. The magnitude of this auto-regressive effect is coupled with the 
large estimate of the interest rate smoothing weight obtained within this method - 
dynamic programming cum FIML -, and explains some of the discrepancy between 
interest rates fitted by the two approaches, apparent in figure 3. Notably, the series 
generated by Lagrangean-FIML lags both actual and Euler-GMM fitted rates throughout 
the whole sub-sample, thus exposing the importance of the auto-regressive element of 
the optimal policy rule in generating the good Lagrangean-FIML fit. Hence, figure 3 
calls for a closer examination of the disparity between the estimated weights of interest 
rate smoothing in the policymaker loss function – µ =  2.210 in Lagrangean-FIML 
versus µ = 0.013 in Euler-GMM –, which is the major discrepancy between the results 
of the two methods. FEP Working Paper no. 123, March 2003 
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In general, differences in the results could derive from the attributes of the 
econometric techniques employed in each procedure. However, more specific 
differences could be more directly linked to the disagreement in the estimates of µ. For 
example, Soderlind et al. (2002) suggest that it would be the case of the horizon 
truncation specific to the Optimal Control cum GMM. Next, we speculatively offer two 
additional specific reasons, one related to expectations and the other to stationarity. 
In the Euler-GMM approach the policymaker’s expectations are replaced by actual 
values of inflation, while in the Lagrangean-FIML approach the optimal linear rule is 
state contingent, therefore depending only upon observed variables. If the observed 
smooth path of the actual interest rate merely reflects the inevitable smoothness of 
policymakers’ forecasts - like Goodhart (2000) argues -, then the Euler-GMM method, 
yielding a smaller estimate of the importance of interest rate smoothing, ends up 
estimating underlying preferences conceptually closer to the theoretical loss function. 
The other possible explanation is related to the different treatment of non-
stationarities by the two methods. The Euler equation imposes, by construction, that the 
relationship between the interest rate and its recent past depends solely on the discount 
factor - which is calibrated, not estimated. In turn, the Lagrangean computation of the 
optimal policy rule does not restrict the lagged interest rate coefficients, thus admitting 
non-stationary results. In fact, the method always finds an optimal linear policy rule, 
even when the system does not reach a steady-state – Chow (1997, page 25). 
Stationarity can be checked through expressions (6, without innovations) and (8) above, 
















0 C A C B A B A A A
− − − = = =  FEP Working Paper no. 123, March 2003 
 
  23
The state vector converges to an equilibrium – a unique stationary distribution - if 
and only if the maximum absolute value of the characteristic roots of matrix  )
~ ~
( G B A+  
is strictly smaller than unity – Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000, chapter 4). We recall that 
G is the vector of the optimal policy rule coefficients, and  G B
~
 reflects the degree of 
smoothing in the optimal path of the interest rate. 
Table 4 reports the maximum eigenvalues for the two sub-samples and the two 
policy regimes considered in our estimations. Even though the smaller one corresponds 
to the most precisely estimated regime and sub-sample, the absolute values are all close 
to one, i.e. very much on the boundary between stationarity and non-stationarity. This 
does not seem to be a problem in other monetary policy studies - close to ours in the use 
of dynamic programming but with calibrated instead of estimated policy preferences - 
that often report maximum eigenvalues very close to unity.
14 However, we suspect that 
in cases like ours, where dynamic programming is linked to the estimation of all the 
parameters, such quasi non-stationarity might generate numerical problems in 
estimating policymakers' preferences, including the relevance of interest rate smoothing. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
The empirical research in this paper uncovers a well-defined monetary policy regime 
starting in 1986 in the aggregate Euro Area, in spite of the institutional prevalence of 
national monetary policies until 1999. Remarkably, both alternative solution-estimation 
methods employed - optimal control cum GMM and dynamic programming cum FIML 
- identify a regime of strict inflation targeting with significant interest rate smoothing, 
with a target around 2.7 percentage points. The unemployment gap, although not 
showing up as an argument in the objective function of the notional monetary authority, FEP Working Paper no. 123, March 2003 
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is a relevant element of the information set used in policy formulation. Thus, our current 
emphasis in quasi real-time information concerning the gap is well justified, but so it is 
its replacement by real-time data as it becomes available for future research concerning 
the analysis of ECB policymaking. 
The emergence of the regime in 1986 has been concurrent with an apparent 
improvement of the volatility trade-off between inflation and unemployment gap since 
the mid-80s. The results, always according to both methods, also indicate that other 
improving factors have been milder supply shocks and some increase in the ability of 
policymakers to set the interest rate closer to its optimal path. Similar conclusions about 
the factors of volatility improvement - although dated earlier in the 80s - have arisen in 
the research of the US case by Favero and Rovelli (2001) and Dennis (2001). 
A structural break in the mid-90s may also have played a role in reducing volatility, 
but it is too soon to isolate its causes and effects - at least within our framework. The 
truncation of the 1986-2001 sub-sample at 1995 - not reported in section 3 - results in 
an imprecise estimation of the loss function parameters, especially with Euler-GMM, 
which is more sensitive to small sample problems. Still, the Lagrangean-FIML estimate 
of the weight of interest rate smoothing does not change markedly, and the inclusion of 
unemployment as a policy objective is clearly rejected. The estimate of the inflation 
target, in turn, is higher in 1986-1995 than in 1986-2001. Hence, at the moment we can 
only conjecture that the mid-90s structural break detected in the AD-AS system is 
related to a reduction in the desired level of inflation, but not to a significant change of 
the remaining features of the policy regime. 
We confirm that interest rate smoothing is an open problematic issue, not only with 
regard to theoretical explanations but also concerning empirical estimation. The two FEP Working Paper no. 123, March 2003 
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methods we used yield quite different estimates of the importance of instrument inertia 
in the Euro Area loss function, in line with the original studies of Favero and Rovelli 
(2001) and Dennis (2001) for the US. Our tentative assessment of this issue suggests 
that the larger estimates are coupled with quasi non-stationary optimal paths of the 
interest rate, inflation and unemployment gap. FEP Working Paper no. 123, March 2003 
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Appendix: State-space format and Lagrangean solution to the 
policymaker's optimisation problem 
The matrices and vectors of the state-space representation of the dynamic constraints 
of optimisation - expression (6) in the text - can be detailed as follows: 
[] '
1 2 1 2 1 3 2 1 t t t t t t t t t t t t Imπ i i i x x x X − − − − − − − − ∆ = π π π π  
[] ' 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 = B  
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In the solution component of each step of the dynamic programming cum FIML 
method, we solve the dynamic optimisation problem faced by the policymaker with the 
Lagrangean method, as described in Chow (1997, equations 2.12-2.26, pages 22-24).  
A vector of Lagrange multipliers, Λ, is introduced, and its derivatives in order to the 
control and states variables are set to zero, giving a set of first-order conditions. In order 
to solve these conditions for the control variable and the multiplier, Λ(X) is 
approximated by a linear function 
h HX X Λ + = ) (  (A.1) 
The derivatives of the objective function with respect to the control and state 
variables are written as linear functions as well 












Expressions (A.1) - (A.3), together with the linear constraints (expression (6) in the 
text, excluding the innovation vector Εt+1) and with the first-order conditions, are the 
basis for the solution. From the first-order conditions relative to the control variable, 
and the linear approximations (A.1) and (A.3), the optimal state-contingent linear policy 
rule is obtained 
g GX u t t + =  (A.4) 
where 
) ' ( ) ' ( 21
1
22 HA B K HB B K G δ δ + + − =
−  (A.5) 
[] ) ( ' ) ' ( 2
1
22 h HC B k HB B K g + + + − =
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Analogously, using the linear approximation (A.1) and (A.2) for adequate 
substitution in the first-order conditions relative to the state-vector, we obtain 
) ( ' 12 11 BG A H A G K K H + + + = δ  (A.7) 
) ( ' ) ' ( 1 12 h HC A k g HB A K h + + + + = δ δ  (A.8) 
Substituting equation (A.5) into equation (A.7) gives the matrix Riccati equation 
) ' ( ) ' )( ' ( ' 21
1
22 12 11 HA B K HB B K HB A K HA A K H δ δ δ δ + + + − + =
−  (A.9) 
This equation can be solved iteratively for H. Given H, equation (A.5) is used to 
compute G, equation (A.6) to calculate g, and equation (A.8) to obtain h. 
In our specific problem, k1, k2 and K12 are zero, and K22 = µ; K11 is a (11×11) matrix 
of zeros except for K11[1,1]=1,  K11[5,5]=λ, and K11[10,10]=µ; and K21 is a (1×11) 




                                                           
Notes 
 
* We thank Fabio Canova for theoretical and technical comments and suggestions, and 
Richard Dennis for sharing the GAUSS code of his study of the policy preferences of the 
US Federal Reserve. We acknowledge helpful comments from participants at the 2002 
EcoMod Conference (Université Libre de Bruxelles) and at the 2002 Money, Macro and 
Finance Research Group Conference (University of Warwick). The usual disclaimer 
applies. 
1 We use official aggregate data of the Euro Area, from the Area Wide Model Database 
(AWMD) or computed from the AWMD, as described below. We study the Area as a 
whole, as our aim is to see if the aggregate data reveal any well-identified global 
economic structure, and policy regime, throughout a period in which (except for 10 
observations at the end of the sample) nations, not the Area, were the formal economic 
units. 
2 See European Commission (1997, pages 25-46 and Appendix C). 
3 Assuming that the policymaker uses our trend-cycle decomposition model and limits 
its information to the series in the model, there are essentially two differences between 
our quasi real-time estimates and strict real-time estimates. First, real-time estimates are 
published with a lag and are subject to subsequent revisions. Second, real-time 
estimates may be affected by changes in the model identification and parameter 
estimates. 
4 Alternatively, Croushore and Stark (2001) have built real-time data from snapshots of 
published data at quarterly intervals.  
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Notes (continued) 
 
5 Coenen et al. (2001) study the profile of revision of the main macroeconomic 
variables in the Euro Area during 1999 and 2000, using the numbers published in the 
ECB Monthly Bulletin - an approach that should be highly helpful in future research on 
EMU policymaking with real-time data. 
6 We impose dynamic homogeneity into the Phillips curve, as that hypothesis is not 
rejected in an unconstrained estimation and has two advantages: it reduces by one the 
number of coefficients, and it complies more clearly with the natural rate hypothesis. 
7 This result is in contrast with the failure to reject stability typically obtained in the US 
case - see, for example, Rudebusch and Svensson (2002) and, with mixed forward-
backward-looking equations, Rudebusch (2002b). It should be noted, however, that 
these studies perform tests covering breakpoints only until the end of 1992, at most, so 
they could be missing more recent structural breaks, namely on the second half of the 
90s. Our tests, after the adequate 15 percent trimming, cover possible break dates 
between 1976:I and 1997:II. 
8 We assume that the relevant arguments in the Euro Area policymaker loss function are 
variables of the aggregate Area, deliberately disregarding the possibility that nation-
level economic performance might affect the decisions of some or all members of the 
Governing Council - see Aksoy et al. (2002) on that topic. 
9 Despite its empirical appeal, the theoretical foundations for interest rate smoothing are 
far from being consensual. The literature has offered several explanations for optimal 
policy inertia: (i) concerns with financial stability - Cukierman (1992); (ii) 
maximisation of policy efficiency with less instrument variability, in view of forward-
looking agents - Goodfriend (1991); (iii) policymakers' reaction to uncertainties - 
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Notes (continued) 
 
Goodhart (1998 and 2000); (iv) concerns with reputation and credibility - Goodhart 
(1996); and (v) concerns with the zero bound of nominal interest rates - Rudebusch 
(2001). 
10 Applied to the Euro Area, this may seem at odds with the Bundesbank record of 
explicit monetary targets since 1974, and with the ECB formal first pillar for policy, 
which is a monetary aggregate growth targeting - see ECB (1998). But, in fact, the 
Bundesbank behaved much more as an inflation targeter than a money targeter - see 
Von Hagen (1995) and Bernanke and Mihov (1997) -, the role of money targets being 
mostly political, as argued by Von Hagen (1999). In what regards the ECB, several 
recent studies have found no evidence that money has been relevant in its policy 
decisions - Mihov (2001) and Begg et al. (2002). 
11 We use Andrews and Mohanan's (1992) pre-whitening and a Bartlett Kernel to weight 
the auto-covariances, with a bandwith estimated with Andrews' (1991) estimator. We 
employ the two-step estimator, which is a one-step weighting matrix version of GMM. 
Covariance estimation is difficult in cases, like ours, of serially correlated moment 
conditions and small samples - see Hansen et al. (1996) and the other articles in that 
special edition of the Journal of Business and Economic Statistics (vol. 14, n. 3). Our 
choice of GMM estimator draws largely from Florens et al.'s (2001) Monte Carlo 
results indicating that the two-step estimator generates estimates close to maximum 
likelihood and is not strongly biased in the estimation of forward-looking Taylor rules. 
12 Richard Dennis' GAUSS code has been an invaluable basis for ours', which 
implements the numerical solution by linear approximations described in Chow (1997). 
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13 We have also checked the sensitivity of the results to possibly earlier dates of 
emergence of the well-defined monetary policy regime. It turns out that 1986:I is the 
first date of beginning of the estimation period in which the interest rate smoothing 
weight has significance probability below 5 percent. In addition, there is a clear 
improvement in the main indicators of quality of the estimation at that quarter, in 
comparison to the results of estimation from sub-sample periods beginning earlier. 
14 For instance, Aksoy et al. (2002), with data of the Euro Area member-states, report 
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Figure 1. Macroeconomic Volatility in the Aggregate Euro Area 
1972-2001 
 
Notes: Data sources - Area Wide Model Database (AWMD, published in Fagan et al, 2001), European 
Central Bank Monthly Bulletin, and authors' calculations. 
Inflation variability is the average of square deviations of the quarterly inflation rate from its 
desired level of 0.5 (2 percent annual inflation). 
The inflation rate is the first difference of the log of the GDP deflator. 
Unemployment gap variability is the average of square deviations of the quarterly unemployment 
gap from its desired level of zero. 
The unemployment gap is computed from a backward-looking version of the unobserved 
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Figure 2. Unsmoothed versus Smoothed Unemployment Gap in the 
Euro Area, 1972-2001 
Note: The unsmoothed line is the u-gap estimates given by the Kalman filter - see Harvey (1989, 
equations 3.2.1 - 3.2.3, pages 105-106), while the smoothed line is the estimate given by the fixed-
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Table 1. Macroeconomic Structure and Policymaker's Loss Function with Flexible Inflation Targeting and 
Interest Rate Smoothing 
 
 Notes: Discount factor - δ = 0.975. 
[Prob.] - one-sided significance probabilities. 
† Imprecisely estimated because based on at least one coefficient with too large standard error; 
†† J×nobs. 
ε
Policy - residuals of the Euler equation (optimal control cum GMM) and of the Optimal Policy Rule (dynamic programming cum FIML). 
Optimal Control cum GMM instruments - constant, ∆πt-i, xt-i, it-i, Imπt-i, , i=1,...4. 
Dynamic Programming cum FIML - standard-errors are the diagonal elements of the inverse of the Information Matrix square-rooted. 
1972:I - 1985:IV 1986:I - 2001:II
Optimal Control - GMM Dynamic Programming - FIML Optimal Control - GMM Dynamic Programming - FIML
Estimates (Test stat) [Prob.] Estimates (Test stat) [Prob.] Estimates (Test stat) [Prob.] Estimates (Test stat) [Prob.]
IS
c1 0,027 (2.41) [0.02] 0,012 (0.59) [0.28] 0,092 (3.25) [0.00] 0,098 (2.24) [0.01]
c2 1,167 (24.36) [0.00] 1,053 (9.56) [0.00] 1,246 (16.94) [0.00] 1,231 (11.03) [0.00]
c3 -0,023 (-0.28) [0.78] 0,139 (0.81) [0.21] -0,248 (-3.03) [0.00] -0,315 (-1.80) [0.04]
c4 -0,288 (-5.38) [0.00] -0,300 (-2.97) [0.00] -0,019 (-0.43) [0.67] 0,075 (0.67) [0.25]
c5 -0,028 (-7.05) [0.00] -0,019 (-2.11) [0.02] -0,021 (-3.60) [0.00] -0,022 (-2.32) [0.01]
σ(ε
IS) 0,170 0,163 0,133 0,128
Phillips 
c6 0,577 (10.95) [0.00] 0,441 (3.69) [0.00] 0,578 (19.33) [0.00] 0,600 (5.58) [0.00]
c7 0,345 (5.08) [0.00] 0,337 (2.64) [0.00] 0,166 (3.54) [0.00] 0,114 (0.95) [0.27]
c8 -0,036 (-0.93) [0.36] -0,047 (-0.36) [0.36] 0,041 (0.84) [0.41] 0,003 (0.03) [0.49]
c9 0,072 (3.65) [0.00] 0,340 (1.35) [0.09] 0,129 (2.40) [0.02] 0,178 (1.10) [0.14]
c10 0,047 (4.82) [0.00] 0,030 (1.79) [0.04] 0,049 (11.12) [0.00] 0,050 (3.58) [0.00]
σ(ε
Phillips) 1,364 1,373 0,838 0,806
Policy Regime
π* 9,390 (36.58) [0.00] 9.74 †  -- 2,910 (9.83) [0.00] 2,660 --
λ -0,240 (-3.52) [0.00] 96,680 (0.54) [0.29] -0,180 (-1.64) [0.10] 1,724 (0.67) [0.25]
µ -0,002 (-1.03) [0.30] 49,540 (0.92) [0.18] 0,008 (1.62) [0.11] -1,992 (-0.28) [0.39]
r* 0,970 --0.68 † -- 4,390 4,520 --
σ(ε
Policy) 0,008 0,817 0,009 0,466
J Statistic 0,650 (33.13) †† [0.51] 0,400 (24.78) †† [0.99]FEP Working Paper no. 123, March 2003 
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Table 2. Macroeconomic Structure and Policymaker's Loss Function with Strict Inflation Targeting and 
Interest Rate Smoothing 
 
Notes: Discount factor - δ = 0.975. 
[Prob.] - one-sided significance probabilities. 
† Imprecisely estimated because based on at least one coefficient with too large standard error; 
†† J×nobs. 
ε
Policy - residuals of the Euler equation (optimal control cum GMM) and of the Optimal Policy Rule (dynamic programming cum FIML). 
Optimal Control cum GMM instruments - constant, ∆πt-i, xt-i, it-i, Imπt-i, , i=1,...4. 
Dynamic Programming cum FIML - standard-errors are the diagonal elements of the inverse of the Information Matrix square-rooted. 
1972:I - 1985:IV 1986:I - 2001:II
Optimal Control - GMM Dynamic Programming - FIML Optimal Control - GMM Dynamic Programming - FIML
Estimates (Test stat) [Prob.] Estimates (Test stat) [Prob.] Estimates (Test stat) [Prob.] Estimates (Test stat) [Prob.]
IS
c1 0,039 (4.00) [0.00] 0,014 (0.64) [0.26] 0,090 (3.16) [0.00] 0,100 (2.22) [0.01]
c2 1,123 (25.73) [0.00] 1,053 (9.61) [0.00] 1,269 (17.16) [0.00] 1,227 (11.10) [0.00]
c3 0,100 (1.36) [0.18] 0,134 (0.78) [0.22] -0,252 (-2.89) [0.00] -0,312 (-1.80) [0.04]
c4 -0,394 (-8.25) [0.00] -0,290 (-2.91) [0.00] -0,035 (-0.79) [0.43] 0,071 (0.64) [0.26]
c5 -0,029 (-9.64) [0.00] -0,020 (-2.43) [0.01] -0,020 (-3.40) [0.00] -0,022 (-2.33) [0.01]
σ(ε
IS) 0,173 0,164 0,133 0,128
Phillips 
c6 0,579 (13.26) [0.00] 0,427 (3.67) [0.00] 0,589 (19.68) [0.00] 0,599 (5.65) [0.00]
c7 0,365 (7.89) [0.00] 0,331 (2.61) [0.00] 0,151 (3.42) [0.00] 0,115 (0.97) [0.17]
c8 -0,069 (-1.60) [0.11] -0,034 (-0.26) [0.40] 0,040 (0.85) [0.40] 0,004 (0.04) [0.48]
c9 0,107 (4.14) [0.00] 0,450 (2.56) [0.00] 0,115 (2.32) [0.02] 0,139 (1.66) [0.05]
c10 0,039 (4.85) [0.00] 0,028 (1.71) [0.04] 0,049 (11.83) [0.00] 0,048 (3.68) [0.00]
σ(ε
Phillips) 1,364 1,373 0,840 0,808
Policy Regime
π* 9,040 (31.40) [0.00] 9.74 † -- 2,710 (9.48) [0.00] 2,669 --
µ -0,001 (-0.72) [0.48] 43,880 (1.07) [0.14] 0,013 (2.55) [0.01] 2,210 (1.63) [0.05]
r* 1,340 --0.68 † -- 4,480 4,518 --
σ(ε
Policy) 0,019 0,826 0,011 0,467
J Statistic 1,073 (54.71) †† [0.01] 0,397 (24.59) †† [0.99]FEP Working Paper no. 123, March 2003 
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Table 3. Optimal Policy Rule from a regime of Strict Inflation 
Targeting and Interest Rate Smoothing 
 
Notes: Optimisation-estimation method - dynamic programming cum FIML. 
Discount factor - δ = 0.975.  
Sums - sum of coefficients of inflation, gap, interest rate, and imported inflation, respectively. 
Long-run coefficients - optimal cumulative reaction of the interest rate to a permanent change in 
each state variable; for instance, the long-run response to inflation is 
) i i 1 /( ) ( 2 9 1 8 3 4 2 3 1 2 1 − − − − − − − + + + t t t t t t g g g g g g π π π π . 




Table 4. Maximum Absolute Value of Eigenvalues of Matrix  )
~ ~
( G B A+  
 
  1972:I - 1985:IV  1986:I - 2001:II 
Loss:    
Flexible π targeting (with i 
smoothing) 
0.988 0.996 
Strict π targeting (with i 
smoothing) 
0.991 0.984 
Notes: Optimisation-estimation method - dynamic programming cum FIML. 
Discount factor - δ = 0.975.  
 
  1972:I - 1985:IV 1986:I - 2001:II 
Coefficients  Sums Long-run  Coefficients Sums  Long-run 
Coefficients Coefficients
G  π  t   0,033  0,071 1,258 0,100 0,203  2,190
G  π  t-1  0,020  0,043
G  π  t-2  0,010  0,033
G  π  t-3  0,009  0,027
Gx  t  0,109  0,057 1,005 0,260 0,215  2,323
Gx  t-1  -0,017  -0,064
Gx  t-2  -0,034  0,019
Gi  t-1  0,946  0,944 - 0,913 0,907  - 
Gi  t-2  -0,002  -0,006
GIm  π  t  0,001  0,001 0,018 0,005 0,005  0,051
Interest Rate  Standard Deviation Standard Deviation 
Fitted  3,087 2,681 
Actual  2,329 2,654 FEP Working Paper no. 123, March 2003 
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Figure 3. Actual and Fitted Interest Rates from a regime of Strict 
Inflation Targeting and Interest Rate Smoothing 
1986-2001 
Notes: Euler-GMM fitted interest rates - obtained by solving the IS-Phillips-Euler system, using the 
coefficients from the sub-sample 1986:I-2001:II. 
Lagrangean-FIML fitted interest rates - observed interest rates minus residuals of optimal policy 
rule from the sub-sample 1986:I-2001:II. 
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